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Preface 
For some time, the ILO has been an active contributor to the debate on globalisation. 
Perhaps its tripartite composition alerted it earlier than other international institutions to the 
benefits but also to the costs of global economic and social integration. More recently the ILO 
has established a World Commission on the Social Dimensions of Globalisation mandated to 
deliver a set of proposals by mid-2003 on a more inclusive globalisation acceptable and fair to 
all. These debates find direct resonance in Panama. 
As many other countries, Panama illustrates both the opportunities of globalisation and 
its social and economic costs. In spite of its privileged geographical location, Panama struggles 
to adapt its economy and society to the global economy. The benefits of economic growth have 
been and are unequally shared, and some areas and groups have shouldered a disproportionate 
burden in the restructuring implied by greater openness. This is hampering Panama’s ability to 
achieve faster economic growth, greater social cohesion and higher standards of living. 
The ILO response to globalisation is decent work, or greater opportunities to secure a 
decent job with an adequate level of social protection and a voice in decision-making. Hence, 
this study examines the situation in Panama from the point of view of decent work. It is a 
forward looking analysis in the sense that it seeks to identify some of the main policy areas that 
would need to be addressed for Panama to combine economic growth and social development. 
Looking at a country from a decent work perspective not only draws attention to what needs to 
be addressed, in terms of the combination of economic growth and employment, social 
protection, labour standards, and social dialogue. It also points to how these intertwined issues 
can be addressed. In this Panama is a clear illustration of how neglect in one area, such as 
social policy, undermines the promotion of other areas, such as economic growth. These 
dichotomies have become more problematic in the context of globalisation, as economies and 
societies are challenged to adapt more rapidly to external forces. ILO constituents have 
repeatedly called on the Office to assist them in addressing these challenges. 
Policy integration in the sense of spelling out the implications of distinct sectoral 
policies on actual outcomes as well as the coherence between these policies in the sense of 
adding up to a whole enabling a country to move forward is very much an issue on the decent 
work agenda. Interestingly, it appears to be an issue in Panama. An appropriate policy mix has 
so far been interpreted in strict macroeconomic terms. In view of the importance gained and 
increasingly given to social issues, including labour matters, this mix has to be rethought in 
terms of broader economic and social objectives. 
This study was carried out in the context of ILO’s efforts to promote decent work and 
to spell out concretely what sets of policies hold the promise of achieving that objective. 
Panama is one of an initial set of countries where the ILO and its constituents have agreed to 
explore the manifold dimensions of a decent work agenda. This has implied in the course of 
essentially 2001 intense collaboration between the Government of Panama, principally the 
Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Finance and Economy, the national employers’ 
organisation (CONEP) and the national trade union coordinating body (CONATO), the Social 
Security Fund, and the ILO, both its Office in San José and several units at its headquarters in 
Geneva. A series of workshops and meetings have been organised during the year 2001 and 
into early 2002 to consider the various studies and reports produced by the decent work 
ii 
programme and to engage in genuine tripartite discussions of topical policy issues fed by the 
analytical work carried out. 
We are indebted to Enrique Bru, Director of the ILO Office in San José and to Miguel 
del Cid, coordinator of the decent work programme in Panama, as well as to M. Muqtada of the 
Employment Strategy Department, Employment Sector for the excellent collaboration that 
made this work possible. 
Readers interested in issues of globalisation as well as those motivated by the notion of 
decent work will form natural audiences for the analysis and messages found in this paper. 
Comments and reactions are always welcome. 
July 2002 
Gerry Rodgers 
Director 
Policy Integration Department 
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Introduction1 
Globalization had been a feature of Panama’s history long before this term passed 
into daily use. The Panama Canal, opened in 1914, remains today a lifeline of international 
maritime transport. Its reversion to national control in 1999 has, if anything, underscored 
its global character. Panama also lends its flag to a sizeable merchant shipping fleet, most 
of which is owned and operated by non-residents. Finally, Panama has woven tight 
linkages with the international financial community through its banking centre. In many 
ways, Panama’s economy is intimately dependent on global economic trends and thus 
vulnerable to external shocks, particularly in relation to the North American business 
cycles. Yet Panama is also a relatively late liberaliser, with full-scale liberalization of 
imports, intervening in effect only since 1997, when all tariffs were reduced to a maximum 
rate of 15 per cent, in the wake of it’s joining the World Trade Organization. 
In several ways, Panama is distinct from the rest of Central and Latin American 
economies. It adopted the US dollar as its currency very early in the 20th century, and 
therefore has no central bank nor is exposed to any foreign exchange risk. Largely due to 
this, its rate of inflation, as measured by consumer prices, averaging 1-2 per cent per year 
over the last several decades, is low by international standards, not to speak of regional 
ones. In spite of these singular features, Panama shares much of the same predicament as 
other countries in the region. It experienced sluggish growth during the 1980’s, a decade 
that ended with a military invasion deposing a military dictatorship, partly due to a 
mounting fiscal deficit and external public debt. Panama entered into a structural 
adjustment process with the assistance of the IMF in ways similar to the rest of the Latin 
American region. Macroeconomic stability returned in the early 1990’s, and with it 
positive rates of economic growth following a deep recession in 1987-89. GDP growth has 
on average been higher in the 1990’s than in the troubled 1980’s. Yet growth has not been 
anywhere sufficient to generate employment in line with the growth in the labour force, to 
avoid a bulging informal sector and to significantly raise real incomes. Like other countries 
in the region, Panama faces a significant gap between labour demand and labour supply. 
This can be seen in the stubbornly high unemployment rate, that has remained above two-
digits for over a decade now (at an average of 13.9 per cent during the 1990’s). It is also 
evidenced in the growing share of urban informal employment, where employment is more 
a necessity and comes under many forms, all with low levels of productivity and income. 
But Panama also faces a large employment problem, with around half of its labour force 
eking out a living at very low levels in both rural and urban areas. Finally, Panama faces a 
huge internal social debt, with levels of income inequality among the highest of Latin 
America. 
These problems existed in Panama before full-scale liberalization and can in no way 
be attributed to it. However, as elsewhere, it was assumed that rapid trade liberalization 
would substantially lift the rate of growth of the economy by eliminating inefficiencies and 
boosting a more competitive economy. GDP growth did pick up substantially during the 
first half of the 1990’s, but petered out thereafter. Doubts can be entertained as to whether 
liberalization per se is the answer to Panama’s ills. The question is not whether Panama 
should or not liberalize its economy. It is now an open economy, no longer an economy 
with a few open enclaves, and there are very good reasons to suggest that it should remain 
so. The real question is what policies are needed in Panama that would put it on the path of 
The author is indebted to Enrique Bru and Miguel del Cid for careful guidance and fruitful 
discussions and to Catherine Saget and Anne Trebilcock for very useful comments. 
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a high growth economy with a more equal participation in the benefits of economic 
growth. 
This report takes the view of the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work, adopted by the International Labour Conference in June 1998, stating that 
“economic growth is essential but not sufficient to ensure equity, social progress and the 
eradication of poverty” and therefore that “economic and social policies need to be 
mutually reinforcing” in order to create “broad-based sustainable development”. 
Based on the analysis of the economic, social and labour market data available in 
Panama, this report argues that trade and financial liberalization are necessary but 
insufficient measures to build a competitive economy. In particular, supportive 
macroeconomic as well as social and labour market policies, including enhancing 
fundamental principles and rights at work, are required to enable countries such as Panama 
to successfully integrate with the global economy. This is tantamount to a decent work 
policy agenda which the ILO is now actively promoting. 
The macroeconomic policy framework adopted in Panama has not so far been able to 
sustain a high rate of growth of its economy, nor have its social and labour market policies 
lived up to the requirements of an open and competitive economy. In particular, social 
dialogue between employers’ and workers’ organisations and with the government has not 
yet proven to be a conduit for negotiating and agreeing essential reforms in spite of many 
attempts at doing just that. These conclusions are argued in the subsequent sections, based 
on an examination of the economic, social and labour market performance of Panama. The 
policy issues discussed here, although made in the context of one particular country, are of 
more general relevance. Indeed, many other countries in the region find themselves in 
similar situations and face very similar policy dilemmas. 
Recent macroeconomic performance and policy options are considered in Chapter 1. 
Labour market policies and institutions, including training and wage policies are discussed 
in Chapter 2. Social protection policies are examined in chapter 3, followed by 
international labour standards and the role of social dialogue. The concluding section 
discusses policies to promote decent work, Panama’s best option in the context of 
globalisation. 
1. Economic growth and macroeconomic policy 
A middle-income country with extensive poverty and income 
inequality 
With a GNP per capita of 2,990 US dollars in 1998, Panama ranks precisely at the 
world average of middle-income countries. This is however substantially below the 
average for the Latin American and Caribbean region (3,860 US dollars). Yet the incidence 
of poverty in Panama (national poverty line headcount index) was 37.0 per cent in 1997 
(World Bank, 2000), a relatively high level (Colombia’s GNP per capita in 1998 was 2,470 
US dollars, and its poverty rate was 17.7 per cent in 1992). In addition, urban informal 
sector employment, a proxy for low quality employment, is high in Panama, (37.3 per cent 
in 2000, and 39.1 per cent for women) although lower than the average figure for Latin 
America and Caribbean (46.9 per cent) (Panorama Laboral, 2000). This suggests that 
economic growth has not benefited the poor, either because the rate of growth has not been 
sufficiently high, that the pattern of economic growth has not been labour intensive 
enough, or that the distribution of the benefits of growth (which translates into income 
distribution) has been excessively unequal, or any combination of these. 
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i) A slow growing economy 
The overall growth performance in Panama has been disappointing over the last two 
decades. Gross domestic product increased at an average rate of 2.4 per cent over 1982-
2000, well below the average of 3.5 per cent for the Latin America and Caribbean region. 
GDP per capita increased at an annual rate of 0.5 per cent over the same period, against 1.3 
per cent for the regional average. The economy picked up during the 1990’s (GDP growth 
of 4.5 over 1991-2000), following poor performance during the first half of the 1980’s 
marked by rising indebtedness and a deep recession topped with political turmoil at the end 
of the 1980’s (GDP growth of 1.7 per cent for 1982-86 and –6.2 per cent for 1987-89). Yet 
the strong recovery witnessed during 1990-94 (6.5 per cent GDP growth) was short-lived 
and growth performance has been disappointing as of 1995 (3.5 per cent for 1995-00). 
Table 1: Macro-economic indicators 
GDP (1982 prices) 
GDP per capita (1982 prices) 
Gross domestic investment/1 
Private consumption/1 
Exports of goods and services/1 
Imports of goods and services/1 
1982-86 
1.67 
-0.40 
-8.14 
5.38 
-0.50 
-4.91 
Average 
1982-2000 
2.40 
0.47 
3.30 
3.79 
2.35 
2.52 
annual rate of 
1991-2000 
4.49 
2.11 
13.38 
3.64 
1.02 
2.40 
change 
1990-94 
6.45 
4.54 
37.30 
4.86 
10.20 
11.57 
1995-2000 
3.45 
1.73 
7.07 
6.20 
-3.30 
-1.00 
Note: 1/ deflated by GDP deflator, latest value is for 1999. 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 2001. 
Figure 1: Real GDP per person 
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Source: IMF, 2001 
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Looking at the trend in GDP per capita, the strong recession of the late 1980’s is 
followed by an equally strong recovery, up to the year 1993, at which point the level of 
1982 is reached again. Thereafter Panama registers two years of flat growth, followed by a 
modest recovery that is not sustained in 2000. 
Over the longer term, Panama’s performance stands out as particularly lacklustre, on 
its own and in comparison with other countries of the region and outside the region. The 
comparison with countries in East Asia is particularly revealing. With an average annual 
increase in GNP per capita of 0.7 per cent, the performance over 1965-98, Panama would 
need 99 years to double its GNP per capita income level. The same could be achieved in 
only 11 years should Panama move to the rate of growth of GNP per capita registered by 
Singapore (6.4 per cent per year) over the same period. 
Table 2: Panama in perspective 
Percentage annual change, 1965-98 
GNP Population Labour Value Private Gross Exports of 
force added consumption domestic goods and 
investment services 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Panama 
Singapore 
LAC 
E.Asia&Pacific 
Source: World 
4.2 
4.0 
3.0 
8.4 
3.5 
7.5 
per 
capita 
2.0 
1.2 
0.7 
6.4 
1.3 
5.4 
2.2 
2.7 
2.3 
1.9 
2.1 
1.8 
Development Indicators, 2000 
3.2 
3.5 
2.9 
3.1 
2.8 
2.2 
Agriculture 
2.7 
3.2 
2.1 
-1.4 
2.6 
3.6 
Industry 
4.5 
4.7 
2.5 
8.5 
3.2 
9.9 
Services 
5.0 
4.1 
2.5 
8.5 
3.9 
7.9 
4.1 
3.2 
4.4 
6.6 
3.5 
6.7 
Why ? 
The main question therefore is why has Panama’s economy registered such slow 
growth. With a privileged geographical position bordering on two seas, a vital link for 
international maritime transport, proximity to the major North American market, tropical 
weather with good soils, there is no a priori reason to believe Panama could not replicate 
an East Asian success story. But it is far from even nearing the rates of growth observed in 
East Asia up to the crisis of 1997. In addition, Panama has not experienced serious 
economic disequilibria in the form of high inflation or currency devaluations that have 
plagued so many other countries in the region. Neither is population growth a particular 
strain, as its rate of growth has been declining in line with the pattern observed in the 
region (the projected annual rates of growth are 1.2 and 1.3 per cent respectively for the 
period 1998-2015). 
Changing composition of output 
The fundamental reason for slow economic growth can be found in the recent 
economic history of Panama as a service economy. Specifically, Panama has over the last 
30 years tended to consolidate the weight of the services sector in the economy, relegating 
the primary and secondary sectors to a marginal role. Between 1971 and 2000, the 
combined contribution of the primary and secondary sectors to total output declined from 
31.3 per cent to 25.6 per cent. The rate of growth of agriculture and industry over the 
longer term (2.1 and 2.5 per cent respectively for 1965-98) has been below the rate of 
4.6 5.7 
4.8 7.0 
4.3 -0.1 
9.6 
1.8 5.9 
9.8 10.5 
4 Working Paper No. 3.doc 
growth of total output. It is also below the growth observed in Colombia and Costa Rica, 
and well below the rates registered in East Asia. 
Between 1985 and 1999, the composition of output has not substantially changed, 
with over 74 per cent of total GDP originating from the services sector, followed by the 
goods sector with 18 per cent and the agriculture sector contributing less than 8 per cent of 
GDP in 1999. 
Table 3: GDP and employment by economic activity 
Agriculture 
Mining 
Manufacturing 
Electricity 
Construction 
Trade 
Transport 
Finance 
Services 
Total 
1985 
8.64 
0.08 
9.40 
3.94 
3.21 
16.26 
13.30 
26.42 
18.74 
100 
1991 
9.02 
0.09 
9.96 
4.26 
2.48 
20.41 
13.01 
22.33 
18.44 
100 
Relative participation by economic 
GDP 
1995 
8.24 
0.14 
9.97 
4.21 
4.19 
20.73 
12.33 
24.01 
16.18 
100 
Source: ECLAC for GDP and ILO and national sources for 
1999 
7.52 
0.24 
8.73 
4.81 
4.47 
18.91 
13.87 
25.77 
15.69 
100 
employment 
activity in 
1985 
29.46 
0.06 
10.62 
1.45 
5.31 
13.89 
5.96 
3.89 
29.35 
100 
Employment 
1991 
26.66 
0.10 
9.63 
1.22 
3.25 
19.87 
6.91 
4.17 
28.19 
100 
1995 
20.80 
0.18 
10.68 
1.02 
6.18 
20.72 
7.32 
5.41 
27.68 
100 
1999 
17.43 
0.09 
9.78 
0.73 
7.59 
23.11 
7.59 
6.59 
27.08 
100 
The more recent period of the 1990’s confirms the relative decline of the primary and 
manufacturing sectors with rates of growth below the level registered for aggregate output. 
The dynamic sectors for the period have been mining, construction, transport, financial 
services and electricity. 
(ii) Causes of the relative decline of the non-
services economy 
Poor export performance 
A small country with a population of 2.8 millions in 1998, Panama is necessarily 
dependent on the external market for its growth. Up to the mid-1980’s however Panama’s 
economy was composed on the one hand of a tradable service sector, primarily the Canal, 
international banking and a dynamic free trade zone in Colón, the second-largest city after 
Panama City. On the other hand, there is a protected sector in non-tradables, consisting of 
agriculture, manufacturing, construction and services. In particular, relatively high tariff 
barriers in the import-substitution tradition protected agriculture and manufacturing. As in 
many other countries, there was little import substituting production, and much non-
competitive rent seeking. Incentives to export were few and certainly no counterpart to the 
tariff protection. As a result export performance was dismal. Over the longer period 
exports declined at a rate of –0.1 per cent per year. Following the recession of 1986-89 and 
the stabilisation measures introduced in 1990-92, exports grew at an impressive 5.2 per 
cent for 1990-94, but subsequently declined to 1.1 per cent over 1995-2000. Over the same 
periods, imports grew respectively at an annual rate of 7.2 per cent and 3.1 per cent. 
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Trade liberalization 
The first measures aiming to reduce tariffs on imports were taken in 1986. But it is 
only in 1997 with Panama’s entry to the World Trade Organization, that the government 
reduced all tariffs to a maximum of 15 per cent. In 1998 the weighted mean tariff for all 
products was 8 per cent. There was no need to liberalize the capital account in view of 
Panama using the US dollar as its currency. The government’s intention in lifting import 
tariffs was to introduce more competition in the domestic economy and to eliminate the 
rent-seeking activities that survived behind the high protection. Many governments in 
Latin America have liberalized imports virtually overnight as a means to lift the 
competitiveness of their economies. The question this raises in Panama as in other 
countries of the region is not whether open markets are more efficient than protected ones. 
Rather it is how countries should proceed to liberalize their imports within what time 
frame, content and sequence of policies. In the words of a recent document submitted to 
the ILO Governing Body: 
“The gains from trade are undeniable as are the costs of protectionism, so the issue is 
not whether countries should benefit from freer trade but how this should be achieved.” 
(ILO, 2001b). 
In effect the “big bang” approach adopted by several countries in Latin America 
stands in stark contrast to the one adopted by countries in East Asia that have pursued 
selective export promotion policies first followed by gradual import liberalization later. 
This is well illustrated in the literature drawing the lessons from the fast growth of East 
Asian countries for the relatively slower growers in Latin America.2 What the East Asian 
experience suggests is that import liberalization per se cannot be seen as a sufficient 
measure to boost the competitiveness of an economy, neither for export oriented 
enterprises and sectors nor for activities competing with imports in the domestic market. 
At some point in the growth process, particularly for small countries with no domestic 
market to rely on, import liberalization is a necessary step. Yet, this should be one measure 
among a set of measures aiming to boost exports and strengthen sectors and enterprises 
competing with imports. Other important elements are the sequencing of measures, 
between export promotion and import liberalization and between the latter and capital 
account liberalization, as well as the overall macroeconomic context within which such 
measures are taken. Clearly, liberalization and tariff reductions are only one among a range 
of measures and policies required to raise the rate of growth of output. 
Exchange rate appreciation 
There are other reasons suggesting why import liberalization per se needs to be 
approached within a set of measures. Precisely because Panama faces no foreign exchange 
risk, it cannot resort to any exchange rate policy to stimulate exports and refrain imports. 
However, Panama is nevertheless subject to variations in the real value of the US dollar, 
which would affect not only its trade with countries outside the dollar zone, but also its 
terms of trade within the dollar zone (reflecting the relative import content of domestic 
production). In this way, the real multilateral exchange rate of the US dollar also reflects 
…in the current world context of liberalization and globalization, the East Asians have been 
reluctant liberalizers. Contrary to the thrust of the Bretton Woods institutions, the East Asian 
countries during the last three decades have not sought close integration with the world 
economy but have instead sought what the present author has elsewhere termed a ‘strategic 
integration’- that is, they have integrated to the degree to which and in the spheres in which it 
was in their interest to do so. Thus, they have traditionally been open with respect to exports but 
not so open with respect to imports.” Ajit Singh, 1997. 
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the competitive position of Panama’s economy. During the 1985-97 period this indicator 
appreciated by 24.4 per cent, precisely during the time when Panama was liberalizing its 
imports (Jimenez, 2001). An appreciation of the real exchange rate of this magnitude is 
bound to have a strong incentive effect to imports and an equally strong disincentive effect 
to exports. A recent review of the experience with external liberalization suggests 
explicitly that such a combination should definitely be avoided (Berg and Taylor, 2000). It 
explains the poor growth performance of a number of countries that could not avoid it and 
the better performance of countries that did avoid it. 
Interest rates 
With no central bank and without any need to accumulate foreign reserves to pay for 
its external obligations, it would seem that interest rates would be exogenous in Panama. 
One should observe a tendency for interest rates in Panama (effectively commercial 
interest rates) to align themselves with international rates. But this is far from being the 
case. Commercial lending rates in Panama have hovered around 12 and 10 per cent during 
the 1990’s with an average of 10.9 per cent, approximately 50 per cent above the rates of 
around 5-6 per cent observed in the United States at the same time. The only reason that 
could explain such a difference would be any additional risk on credit present in Panama 
and not in the United States. And we have seen this cannot be found in any foreign 
exchange risk that is inexistent in Panama. In the absence of any national central bank 
whose monetary policy would guide credit policy of banks, these can only be guided by 
their own assessments of future trends in economic growth and intrinsic credit worthiness 
of each loan applicant. As a result it has been observed that credit to the private sector in 
Panama is highly pro-cyclical and in fact endogenous (Jimenez, 2001). Rates tend to rise 
during recessions and decline during periods of expansion. Commercial banks seem to be 
guided by their assessment of loan performance and their record of non-performing loans 
and arrears. These tend to be very cyclical. This points to another lesson from the recent 
experiences with liberalization. High domestic interest rates, combined with real exchange 
rate appreciation in a period of rapid import liberalization are a poor policy mix that is 
clearly counterproductive. Production costs and capital formation are penalized precisely at 
a time when enterprises are required to be more competitive. 
Investment and capital formation 
Gross domestic investment as a percentage of GDP averaged 27.8 per cent over the 
1990’s. Such a rate is close to East Asian levels known for their high investment/GDP 
ratios. However upon closer scrutiny, it appears that investment in construction, 
particularly housing, reaps the lion’s share of domestic investment, with 54.2 per cent on 
average over the period, whereas capital goods other than transport equipment represent 
28.1 per cent on average. Public investment is 15.5 per cent on average of total domestic 
investment in the 1990’s (Jimenez, 2001). The question is why is there not more private 
productive investment that would increase the production potential of Panama’s economy. 
High levels of investment relative to GDP are not, per se, sufficient to ensure sustained 
growth in the future if such investment is not attracted toward increasing the production 
potential of the economy. 
Fiscal balance and public debt 
As with many countries in the region, economic performance was lacklustre during 
the “lost decade” of the 1980’s. Panama registered consistent and sizeable fiscal deficits 
between 1982 and 1989, from an average of 7.5 per cent of GDP in 1982-84 to 3 per cent 
in 1987-89. A positive balance was achieved during the high growth period up to 1995, 
with only a moderate deficit up through 1998. The accumulation of sizeable deficits 
bloated the external public debt that reached 69.3 per cent of GDP in 1983, down to 48.2 
per cent in 1993, and still 55.5 per cent in 2000. Such a public debt to GDP ratio is by no 
means unsustainable, but does represent a sizeable burden on fiscal capacity. A first 
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structural adjustment programme was agreed with the IMF in 1982. A second severe fiscal 
adjustment was introduced in 1990, following the military invasion. Only much higher 
levels of economic growth, based in particular on higher exports, would enable the country 
to reduce its debt to GDP ratio and recover space to raise domestic public investment. 
Figure 2: Fiscal balance 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 2001 
(iii) Consequences of slow growth in a services 
economy 
Liberalization without sustained growth 
Over the 1990s Panama’s economy grew at an average rate of 4.5 per cent (1991-00), 
excluding the atypical year of 1990. During that same period, domestic investment 
increased at an average rate of 11.5 per cent. But growth was led by private consumption 
that increased at 5 per cent per year over the period, whereas exports only increased at a 
rate of 1.6 per cent, less than half the rate of imports. It is more than likely that the high 
rate of growth of domestic investment is linked to a construction boom, particularly private 
housing, fuelled by renewed confidence and greater availability of commercial credit. But 
a pattern of growth in which growth in private consumption exceeds total output growth, 
also reflected in imports rising faster than exports, is not sustainable. For an open economy 
to sustain a high rate of economic growth, it is necessary to achieve at a rate of growth of 
exports that is higher than the rate of growth of domestic investment, to avoid any liquidity 
constraint, and for domestic investment to grow at rate above the rate of growth of 
aggregate output. Panama meets the second condition, although the composition of 
domestic investment is not directed towards productive investment, but fails utterly on the 
first. The dismal export performance over the 1990’s is an indication that its growth path is 
not sustainable. Clearly, liberalization has not so far been able to boost exports, as 
evidenced by the growing deficit on the current account of the balance of payments. 
Panama does enjoy sizeable services and factor income, through the Canal and its 
merchant fleet, but not anywhere sufficient to finance its imports. 
The stabilisation trap 
The current account on the balance of payments has been registering a deficit 
throughout the 1990s. The deficit increased from an average of 1.7 per cent in 1990-95 to – 
9.3 per cent for 1996-00. Imports soared with the lower tariffs introduced in 1997 at the 
same time as exports grew only marginally. There are two ways to redress an unsustainable 
current account position. One is to compress aggregate absorption, through higher interest 
rates or reduced government spending for instance. This will tend to curb imports and 
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restore some measure of equilibrium in the trade balance. This is the pattern observed 
during 1986-89. But as soon as demand picks up again, the deficit in the trade balance will 
rise and call for new measures to reduce domestic demand. Many Latin American 
countries are caught in such a stabilisation trap and are finding it difficult to move onto 
higher and more sustained growth paths (UN, 2001). Panama is no exception. An 
alternative route, based on the experience of East Asia, is to engage in a sustained effort to 
boost exports, in particular by rendering investment, including foreign investment, in 
export capacity more attractive. 
Figure 3: Current account of the balance of payments and public debt 
percentages of GDP 
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Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 2001 
These economic trends have invariably left their mark on the labour market. These 
can be captured under four main headings, namely the dominance of services and trade in 
employment, a growing share of informal employment, high and persistent unemployment 
and low and falling labour productivity growth. The next section examines these issues. 
2. Labour market characteristics and policies 
(i) Trends in labour force and employment 
In August 2000, slightly fewer than 1.1 million persons were in the labour force in 
Panama, of which 35.4 per cent women. In line with decelerating population growth, a 
regional feature indicating that Panama and Latin America are well advanced in the 
demographic transition, the working age population (here 15 years and over) increased at a 
rate of 3 per cent in the late 1980’s dropping to 2.1 per cent in the late 1990’s. However, 
the labour force has continued to grow rapidly, up till 1995, followed by a sharp drop in its 
growth in the 1996-2000 period, observed for both men and women. Had the labour force 
continued to grow at the rapid rate of the beginning of the 1990’s, unemployment would 
have been much higher than the 13.3 per cent registered for 2000. The labour force 
participation and employment rates for women are roughly half that of men in Panama, 
although women have been joining the labour force at a rate much higher than men, whose 
labour force participation rates have stagnated, then increased and fallen again over the 
1990’s, whereas those of women continued to rise. As a result, the unemployment rates of 
women are much higher than those of men. As we have seen, the rate of growth of formal 
employment was lower than that of informal employment. Employment growth was 
concentrated in the services sector and in construction. 
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Table 4: Labour market indicators 
1985 
1991 
1995 
2000 
Population 15+ 
Labour force 
Employment 
Unemployment 
Source: SIAL/IL 
Employment rate 
Male 
71.4 
67.2 
72.5 
70.3 
1985-89 
3.0 
3.5 
2.3 
11.0 
Female 
29.0 
29.6 
34.0 
34.2 
Total 
1991-95 
2.2 
4.1 
4.7 
0.5 
Total 
49.9 
48.1 
53.1 
51.9 
Labour force participation rate 
Male 
78.8 
77.1 
81.3 
78.8 
Female 
35.6 
38.2 
42.5 
41.6 
Total 
56.9 
57.4 
61.7 
59.9 
Average annual percentage change 
1996-00 
2.1 
1.8 
2.1 
-0.1 
1985-89 
3.0 
4.6 
3.6 
8.8 
Female 
1991-95 
2.0 
4.8 
5.6 
1.8 
1996-00 
2.3 
2.3 
3.0 
-0.5 
Unemployment rate 
Male 
9.4 
12.8 
10.7 
10.8 
1985-89 
3.0 
2.9 
1.7 
12.8 
Female 
18.4 
22.6 
20.1 
17.9 
Male 
1991-95 
2.4 
3.7 
4.3 
-0.7 
Total 
12.3 
16.1 
14.0 
13.3 
1996-00 
1.9 
1.5 
1.6 
0.3 
A services economy 
The consequence of a composition of output dominated by services is naturally a 
predominant weight of the tertiary sector in total employment. Trade and services totalled 
64.4 per cent of all employment in 1999, but these generated 85.3 per cent of net 
employment over the 1991-99 period. This is somewhat lower than the share of services in 
total output (74.2 per cent in 1999). In 1999, employment in agriculture was 17.5 per cent 
of total employment, 2.3 times higher than its share in total output (7.5 per cent). Industry 
absorbed 18.2 per cent of total employment in 1999, a share equivalent to its contribution 
to total output. The industrial sector contributed 27.4 per cent of total non-agricultural 
employment generation over 1989-99, a reflection of the dynamism of the construction 
sector. 
(ii) A growing share of informal sector employment 
The informal sector3 represented 30 per cent of non-agricultural employment in 1986 
before the severe recession, 33 per cent at the peak of the economic cycle in 1993 and 37.5 
per cent in 1999, a clear upward trend, but still lower than the average for Latin America 
(46.4 per cent). The rate of growth of informal employment (5.9 per cent on average) has 
been above that of formal employment (4.7 per cent) throughout the 1989-99 period. Four 
out of every ten new jobs generated over the period were informal, with one in every four 
jobs an informal independent activity. In 1985-89, formal employment increased less than 
1 per cent annually, a reflection of the crisis, whilst informal employment grew at 5.2 per 
cent annually. During the high growth period (1991-95), formal employment grew at a rate 
of 6.4 per cent, with informal employment growing even faster (8.3 per cent). In the 
following period, formal employment growth slows down to 2.6 per cent, and informal 
employment to 4.5 per cent. 
The informal sector is here defined as the sum of own account workers, excluding professionals 
and technicians, domestic workers and workers in enterprises of up to 5 workers. Other 
definitions exist. For a recent review see ILO, 2002. 
3 
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The share of informal employment in non-agricultural employment in 1999 was 
above average in construction (48.3 per cent), commerce (44.1 per cent) and transport 
(53.2 per cent). The share of own-account workers is also above average in these sectors. 
The composition of non-agricultural informal employment is of interest. Between 1991 
and 2000 the share of own-account workers has increased, whereas that of workers in 
small enterprises (up to 5 workers) and in domestic work has declined. This is clearly a 
sign of excess labour generating its own jobs in the informal sector, with low entry costs. 
Figure 4: Changing composition within the informal sector 
Source: ILO, Panorama Laboral, 2001 
Informality is commonly associated with lower levels of productivity and earnings 
relative to formal sector earnings, and lower levels of protection. These features are also 
found in Panama were average informal income represents on average, for the 1991-99 
period, 40.8 per cent of average formal sector earnings. The World Bank findings are very 
similar (World Bank, 2000). 
Figure 5: Growth of non-agricultural employment (left axis) and share of informal employment and 
unemployment rate (in percentages, right axis) 
Source: SIAL/ILO 
Note: No data are available for either 1984 or 1990 
The World Bank (2000) survey finds a close overlap between poverty and 
informality. Some 70 per cent of all poor are active in the informal sector, and 80 per cent 
for poor women. Over half of all poor are wage workers, predominantly in the private 
sector, and 30 per cent are own-account workers, complemented by 17 per cent who are 
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unpaid family workers, mostly assisting the former independent workers. In relative terms, 
more non-poor workers are found in the public sector and less as own account and unpaid 
family workers. One-fourth of all wage workers (26 per cent) perceive less than the hourly 
minimum wage, but 54 per cent of all poor wage-workers are in this case. Poor wage 
workers earn on average 42 per cent of the wage of a non-poor worker on a monthly basis, 
and somewhat less on an hourly basis (36 per cent). 
Table 5: Status in employment and poverty 
Wage workers 
Public sector 
Private sector 
Own-account workers 
Unpaid family workers 
Total 
Source: World Bank, 2000 
Poor 
53 
6 
47 
30 
17 
100 
Non Poor 
74 
22 
50 
24 
4 
100 
There are various competing or complementary explanations for the growing 
informal sector in Panama as in other countries of the region. The first is based on labour 
force supply exceeding labour demand, with excess labour having to find employment in a 
low labour productivity sector in which wages are flexible and where employment is 
basically a function of supply. Urban labour force supply is a function of demographic 
growth, rising activity rates, particularly of women, plus the rural-urban migration fuelled 
by poverty in rural areas and the rural-urban income gap (agricultural incomes represent on 
average 51.5 per cent of non-agricultural incomes over 1991-99). A well-known 
underlying assumption here is that adjustment of nominal wages in the urban formal sector 
is constrained by exogenous factors. This is the analysis made by the World Bank linking 
the growth of the urban informal sector to labour market segmentation, specifically labour 
legislation in the form of minimum wages, non-wage benefits and high dismissal costs. 
The combined effect of this legislation is to raise the relative cost of labour in the formal 
sector and hence to ration its demand. Lower labour demand in the formal sector relative to 
total supply nurtures an informal sector in which wages are flexible and well below the 
level of the formal minimum wage4. An alternative explanation is to suggest that aggregate 
demand in Panama is constrained, due to a composition of output failing to make full use 
of Panama’s comparative advantage, itself linked to the macroeconomic disequilibria 
discussed above. This is not to say that labour legislation has no effect on the level of 
formal employment in Panama or any other country or that any reform of the said 
legislation should be ruled out. 
(iii) High and persistent unemployment 
The third characteristic of the labour market is the unemployment rate. The 
unemployment rate jumps to over two-digits in 1985 (12.3 per cent) and has stayed above 
10 per cent since. Total unemployment jumped by 11 per cent between 1985 and 1989, a 
clear indication of falling employment during the recession years. The share of persons 
made redundant in total unemployment went from 60 per cent in 1986 to over 70 per cent 
in 1989. However, during the high growth period (1991-95) unemployment has fallen only 
very moderately from 16 to 14 per cent, and the share of redundancies in total 
Product market regulations, in addition to labour market regulations, have more recently been 
identified as having similar effects, see OECD, 2002. 
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unemployment has continued to rise, suggesting sizeable turnover in the labour market. 
This is in no way particular to Panama, as the combination of positive economic growth 
and rising unemployment appears to be a characteristic of Latin America during the 1990’s 
(UN, 2001). 
Figure 6: Rate of unemployment and share of dismissals 
Source: SIAL/ILO 
Part of the high unemployment can be explained by strong labour force growth, 
during 1985-89 (3.5 per cent) and during the high growth period (4.1 per cent during 1991-
95), particularly female labour force growth, consistently higher than male labour force 
growth. However, labour force growth slowed considerably during the subsequent period 
(to 1.8 per cent during 1996-00), and unemployment fell only marginally to 13.3 per cent 
in 2000. Clearly, more than just cyclical forces are at work here, or else the rate of 
unemployment would have dropped considerably more than it actually has. There are 
several possible and competing explanations to Panama’s high and persistent 
unemployment. The first is a classic case of mismatch between the skills in demand in the 
labour market and the level and characteristics of skills found in the labour force. Although 
the educational level of the labour force has been rising, it has possibly not risen enough 
and the educational and training systems are producing qualifications that are in low 
demand in Panama. Supportive evidence for this hypothesis can be found in the bell shape 
of unemployment rates by level of qualifications, lower for those with only primary 
education and with university education, and higher for those with secondary education, 
completed or not. 
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Figure 7: Rate of unemployment and distribution of unemployed by education level 
Source: SIAL/ILO 
The second possible explanation is similar to the one for the existence of a large 
informal sector. It is linked to the Todaro (1971) hypothesis based on large wage 
differentials between the formal and informal sectors and the ensuing expectation of a 
formal sector job on the part of persons who would rather wait to find suitable employment 
in the formal sector than take up work in the informal sector. This hypothesis is of course 
linked to institutional factors constraining nominal wage adjustment in the formal sector. 
Todaro has refined this basic explanatory pattern suggesting that urban unemployment and 
hence rural-urban migration was basically a function of the rural-urban income 
differentials and the probability of obtaining an urban formal sector job. High urban 
employment growth and a sufficiently high elasticity of migration to the probability of 
finding a formal sector job could lead to an increase in urban unemployment and/or urban 
informal employment. Some of these forces are undoubtedly at work in Panama. 
Real wage growth in the formal sector has not exceeded 0.7 per cent per year on 
average over 1991-99. Wage and earnings growth in the informal sector has been 
somewhat faster, with an average growth of 2.6 per cent over the same period. But the 
average informal sector wage represented in 1999 only 33.6 per cent of the average wage 
in the formal sector. Over 1991-99, this average was only 30 per cent. This substantial 
wage gap between the non-agricultural formal and informal sectors lends support to the 
Todaro hypothesis. It is also congruent with the positive correlation noted above between 
education levels and unemployment rates. 
Another possible explanation is based on the level and composition of aggregate 
demand that is both insufficient and ill-adapted to absorbing the present level of labour 
supply. Sluggish growth in the primary and manufacturing sectors is a testimony of this. 
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Figure 8: Non-agricultural formal and informal real wages and earnings 
Source: SIAL/ILO 
Measurement of unemployment 
It is appropriate here to mention a methodological issue pertaining to the 
measurement of unemployment in Panama. The national labour force survey has been 
criticized by the World Bank (2000) for not adhering to the ILO defined criteria for 
surveying unemployment. In particular the labour force survey does not ask whether 
persons currently without unemployment are available for employment. The labour force 
survey defines three different categories of unemployed persons: 
i) persons without work during the reference week and looking for work, 
ii) persons without work, not looking for employment during the reference work 
but that have looked during the three months prior to the reference week, 
iii) persons without work, and not looking for work neither during the reference 
week nor during the three months prior to it, for various reasons (looked 
earlier, were awaiting a reply, were discouraged). 
The following table decomposes the unemployment rate according to these three 
categories for the period 1991-99. 
Table 6: Decomposition of the rate of unemployment (in percentages) 
National definition (categories i), ii) and iii)) 
Categories i) and ii) 
Category i) 
1991 
16.1 
10.8 
7.9 
1992 
14.7 
9.5 
5.6 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
13.3 
9.5 
6.3 
14.0 
10.6 
7.5 
14.0 
10.7 
7.3 
14.3 
10.6 
7.6 
13.5 
10.0 
6.9 
13.8 11.9 
10.3 8.2 
7.4 5.5 
Source: SIAL/ILO 
Persons without work and looking for work totalled 65 per cent over the period 
equivalent to an average rate of unemployment of 10.0 per cent. The main difference falls 
between persons without work and looking or not looking for work. It is possible hence 
that some of the persons registered as unemployed would not qualify as such were the ILO 
criteria fully applied (ILO, 1982). However, this is no relief from the fact that the 
aggregate employment rate in Panama (at 51.9 per cent in 2000) is low compared with 
S 
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other countries, and hence that there is considerable surplus and unused labour available 
that could be put to more productive use. 
(iv) Women in the labour market 
Women accounted for 35.4 per cent of the labour force in 2000. Their position in the 
labour market reflects well-established determinants of gender segregation. The labour 
force participation rate of women is half that of men. More importantly, the labour force 
participation of poor urban women is only 74 per cent that of non-poor women. More than 
discrimination in wage and earnings, it is other forms of segregation that put women at a 
disadvantage in the labour market. The unemployment rate of women is higher than for 
men, especially among the young. There are proportionately more women than men in the 
urban informal sector, particularly in wage employment. Women are twice as likely than 
men to find employment in the services sector. On average women tend to earn 10 per cent 
less than men, but this would need to be refined with occupation-specific data also 
controlling for hours worked. The share of private sector female wage-workers is lower 
than for men, i.e. there are proportionately more low-paid men than women in private 
wage employment. However the reverse is true for own-account workers, where the share 
of women among the poorest 40 per cent is higher than for men, suggesting than women 
are concentrated in lower-paid activities. 
There are clear male/female differences in the labour market in Panama. But these 
need to be crossed with the no less clear differences between poor and non-poor, including 
poor and non poor women. Over 40 per cent of employed (non-agricultural employment) 
women are in the informal sector. But facilitating greater labour force participation on the 
part of poor women may even represent a higher priority. Clearly, these two areas should 
be high on the public policy agenda in Panama. 
Table 7: Women relative to men 
Labour force participation rate 
Employment rate 
Unemployment rate 
Youth unemployment rate 
Share of non-agricultural informal employment 
Share of non-agricultural informal wage employment 
Average formal sector wage 
Average informal sector wage 
Share of non-agricultural employment in services 
Poorest 40 % in private sector wage employment 
Poorest 40 % in own-account workers 
Ratio 
0.528 
0.486 
1.66 
1.73 
1.16 
2.16 
0.898 
0.865 
2.16 
0.766 
1.27 
Year 
2000 
2000 
2000 
1999 
1999 
1999 
1999 
1999 
2000 
2000 
2000 
Source: SIAL/ILO 
v) Low and falling labour productivity growth 
The last feature of the labour market is the trend growth in labour productivity. The 
combined effect of the growing share of commerce and services and of informal 
employment in non agricultural employment is to weigh on labour productivity growth, 
and hence on wage and earnings growth. Indeed, over the 1985-1999 period, aggregate 
labour productivity fell at an average rate of –0.51 per cent. In all but three sectors, 
agriculture, mining and electricity, employment has increased more rapidly than output, 
implying falling labour productivity growth. Only three sectors register positive labour 
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productivity growth, but these account for less than 13 per cent of total output. In addition, 
rapid rural-urban migration rather than strong output growth explains the positive growth 
in labour productivity in the agricultural sector. 
The implication of falling rates of labour productivity growth is that jobs are created 
at a pace out-stripping output growth. Growth has been highly labour intensive in Panama, 
particularly in the non-agricultural sectors, with employment elasticities close to or higher 
than unity. For the 1991-99 period, the aggregate employment elasticity was 0.8. But this 
implies less value added per employed person, hence lower wages and labour earnings. 
Less productive jobs are also lower quality jobs requiring lesser skills and offering less 
protection. Declining labour productivity is a sign both of a low relative contribution of the 
goods producing sector to total output, chiefly manufacturing and agriculture, as well as of 
the rising share of informal employment in the services sector. 
Table 8: GDP, employment and GDP per employed person by economic activity 
(average annual percentage change) 
Agriculture 
Mining 
Manufacturing 
Electricity 
Construction 
Trade 
Transport 
Finance 
Services 
Total 
1985-91 
0.78 
1.94 
1.01 
1.35 
-4.15 
3.91 
-0.31 
-2.72 
-0.22 
0.05 
GDP 
1991-95 
2.58 
16.93 
4.93 
4.59 
19.57 
5.32 
3.49 
6.84 
1.53 
4.91 
per economic 
1995-99 
1.73 
18.92 
0.68 
7.64 
5.78 
1.74 
7.22 
5.95 
3.29 
4.10 
activity 
1991-99 
2.15 
17.92 
2.79 
6.10 
12.46 
3.51 
5.34 
6.39 
2.41 
4.50 
1985-99 
1.56 
10.79 
2.02 
4.04 
5.02 
3.68 
2.88 
2.39 
1.27 
2.57 
Employment per economic activity 
Agriculture 
Mining 
Manufacturing 
Electricity 
Construction 
Trade 
Transport 
Finance 
Services 
Total 
0.63 
9.78 
0.66 
-0.56 
-5.71 
8.61 
4.85 
3.50 
1.63 
2.32 
-1.53 
22.96 
7.52 
0.00 
23.02 
5.86 
6.28 
11.82 
4.29 
4.76 
-1.81 
-13.40 
0.38 
-5.56 
8.03 
5.47 
3.59 
7.83 
2.06 
2.63 
-1.67 
3.19 
3.88 
-2.82 
15.28 
5.66 
4.92 
9.80 
3.17 
3.69 
-0.69 
5.96 
2.49 
-1.86 
5.77 
6.92 
4.89 
7.06 
2.51 
3.10 
GDP per employed by economic activity 
Agriculture 
Mining 
Manufacturing 
Electricity 
Construction 
Trade 
Transport 
Finance 
Services 
Total 
0.15 
-7.14 
0.35 
1.92 
1.65 
-4.33 
-4.93 
-6.01 
-1.82 
-2.22 
4.18 
-4.90 
-2.40 
4.59 
-2.80 
-0.51 
-2.62 
-4.45 
-2.64 
0.14 
3.61 
37.32 
0.31 
13.98 
-2.08 
-3.54 
3.51 
-1.74 
1.20 
1.43 
3.89 
14.28 
-1.06 
9.18 
-2.44 
-2.04 
0.40 
-3.11 
-0.74 
0.78 
2.27 
4.55 
-0.46 
6.01 
-0.71 
-3.03 
-1.92 
-4.36 
-1.20 
-0.51 
Note: Constant 1982 prices 
Source: ECLAC for GDP and ILO and national sources for employment 
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(vi) The incidence of poverty 
In 1997, one person in every three lived with an income below the national poverty 
line. The poverty rate (headcount rate) was 37.3 per cent according to the World Bank 
survey and 30.2 per cent according to an ECLAC estimate (CEPAL, 2001). The difference 
is attributable to methodological differences in setting the national poverty line and in the 
coverage and sampling of the surveys used, the Encuesta Nacional de Vida in the case of 
the World Bank and the household surveys in the case of ECLAC. Both surveys suggest 
that poverty is much higher in rural areas compared to urban ones. The incidence of 
poverty in 1997 using the World Bank survey was 15.3 per cent in urban areas, and 64.9 
per cent in rural areas, but 95.4 per cent among indigenous people. Over 77 per cent of all 
poor were found in rural areas and close to 23 per cent in urban areas. The ECLAC source 
suggests furthermore that poverty has declined over the 1990’s from 42.8 per cent in 1991 
to 30.2 per cent in 1999, an average decline of 4.3 per cent per year. 
Table 9: Estimates of the incidence of poverty 
national 
Mippe (1996) 55 
World Bank 
(2000) 
ECLAC (2001) 42.8 
de Jong/Vos 
(2000) 
1991 
rural 
71 
50.6 
urban 
47 
40.9 
1994/95 
national rural 
47 72 
36.1 49.2 
urban 
35 
30.8 
1997 
national rural 
37.3 64.9 
33.2 41.9 
42 61 
urban 
15.3 
29.7 
22 
1999 
national rural 
30.2 41.5 
Sources 
urban 
Household survey 
ENV 97 
25.7 Household survey 
ENV 97 
The poverty reduction elasticity of per capita income growth according to ECLAC 
was –1.41 over 1991-99 in Panama, and –2.12 for extreme poverty. That is for every one 
per cent growth in per capita income, the poverty rate diminished by 1.41 per cent. On 
average in Latin America the coefficient of elasticity between per capita income growth 
and the poverty rate was –0.69. Should Panama sustain a per capita income growth of 2.5 
per cent per year (the average for 1991-00 was 2.7 per cent), using the elasticity coefficient 
of poverty reduction calculated by ECLAC, 19 years would be needed to reduce by half 
the poverty rate of 37.3 per cent observed in 1997. Should Panama decide to abide by the 
objective set by the Millennium Declaration of reducing by half the extreme poverty rate 
of 18.8 per cent (1997) by 2015, a GDP per capita growth of 2.1 per cent per year would 
be required. The objective of reducing by half the poverty rate of 37.3 per cent in 15 years 
would require a GDP per capita growth of 3.2 per cent per year on average. The magnitude 
of these challenges should not be underestimated. During the more recent period since 
1996, per capita income growth in Panama dropped to 1.8 per cent. Clearly Panama needs 
to raise the rate of per capita income growth, or alternatively to raise the poverty reduction 
efficiency of economic growth, should it fully live to the Millennium Declaration 
commitment. The Millennium objective of reducing by half the extreme poverty rate seems 
more within reach than the parallel objective of reducing the overall poverty rate by half. 
However both objectives would require a serious reflection on poverty reduction and 
economic and social policies in Panama, as well as considerable commitment on the part of 
the Government and the social partners. 
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Table 10: Years required to reduce by half the poverty rate under different GDP per capita 
rates of growth 
GDP per capita growth 
Elasticity coefficient/1 
Half of poverty rate/2 
Years required 
1.5 
-1.41 
18.7 
32 
Overall poverty 
2.0 
-1.41 
18.7 
24 
2.5 
-1.41 
18.7 
19 
Extreme poverty 
2.1 
-2.12 
9.4 
15 
Notes: 1/ ECLAC source; 2/ World Bank estimate for 1997 
Sources: ECLAC 2001, World Bank 2000 and own calculations 
The World Bank has estimated the cost of eradicating poverty in Panama at 
approximately 5 percent of GDP or 10 per cent of total public expenditure in order to bring 
the living standards of all poor in Panama up to the poverty line in one year. This strikes 
as a rather modest figure compared to the estimates given above. The reason can only be 
found in the highly unequal income distribution found in Panama as well as in the 
relatively shallow depth of poverty. 
Rural poverty 
According to the World Bank survey of 1997, 77.3 per cent of all poor are located in 
rural areas that account for only 44.4 per cent of total population. The incidence of poverty 
in rural areas is 64.9 per cent. Any strategy to reduce poverty in Panama will need to 
address employment and living standards in rural areas. Rural poverty represents a massive 
loss of opportunities and productive resources. Agriculture contributes 7 per cent to total 
GDP but employs 22 per cent of the labour force, suggesting a large productivity gap. 
Income sources are clearly differentiated between the poor and the non-poor in rural areas. 
The poor are more dependent on agricultural activities (41 per cent of all income) for their 
income than on non-agricultural ones, whereas half of total income of the non-poor 
emanates from non-agricultural activities. The poor are also more dependent on wage 
labour in agriculture (15 per cent of total income of the poor). 
Land distribution is unequal in Panama. Among all land-holders, the Gini coefficient 
of land holdings was 0.77 in 1997, close to the average in Latin America marked by 
substantial inequality. The poor own a third of all landholdings in Panama but represent 
over 66 per cent of the rural population. However, owning land is no guarantee of a higher 
income. Only 7 per cent of poor households own a land title. Most poor households own 
only very small plots of less than 5 hectares. In fact the incidence of poverty is higher 
among smallholders than among non-land holding rural households. Among the priority 
issues identified by rural communities are transport, roads and basic services (electricity, 
telephones, water and health). These can only be addressed through public investment in 
basic infrastructure. The scattered nature of rural communities in Panama is an added 
difficulty calling for clear priorities (World Bank, 2000). 
Table 11: Income sources in rural areas, 1997 
(in percentages) 
Agriculture income 
Wage income 
Self-employment 
Non agricultural income 
Non labour income 
Total 
Poor 
41 
15 
26 
35 
23 
100 
Non Poor 
20 
6 
14 
50 
29 
100 
Total 
27 
9 
18 
45 
27 
100 
Source: World Bank, 2000 
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(vii) Child labour 
The incidence of child labour is not massive in Panama, with 8 per cent of children in 
the age group 10-14 years estimated to be working in 1997 (World Bank, 2000). Two 
thirds of all working children combine work and school attendance, with only 36 per cent 
working full time. But few children in these situations are likely to enter or complete 
secondary school. Hence the cost of child labour is lower education and the perpetuation of 
poverty. Child labour is concentrated in rural areas (73 per cent of all working children), 
predominantly in agriculture (46 per cent), and commerce (24 per cent), but also in 
community services and manufacturing, particularly for girls. Clearly child labour, in 
Panama as in many other countries, is an expression of poverty. It can be presumed that 
rising income per capita would gradually eliminate the need for families to rely on their 
children’s contribution to total family income. However, child labour is as much an 
expression of the failure of social policy to target the needs of the poor, particularly with 
regard to education. Whether rising per capita income or better access to basic education 
will completely eradicate child labour is a moot point. Clearly both are required, as they 
will reinforce each other5. 
(viii) Minimum wage policy 
The Government determines the level of the minimum wage, in principle every 
second year, following the consultation of a tripartite minimum wage commission. 
Minimum wages have been left unadjusted between 1983 and 1992, whereas between 1993 
and 2000 they were adjusted four times. In August 2000, there were 17 minimum wages in 
Panama, according to regions, economic activity and establishment size. The number of 
categories has changed over the 1990’s. The median value of the minimum wage 
corresponds to that applicable in small enterprises in manufacturing and trade. The lowest 
value is found in agriculture and the highest in the construction sector, both sectors were 
the standard deviation is highest. Between 1987 and 2000, the real value of the median 
minimum wage increased by 29.5 per cent. Between 1991 and 2000 the median minimum 
wage increased at an average annual rate of 4.7 per cent, whereas the average formal sector 
wage increased at an average rate of less than 1 per cent per year. In 1998, the median real 
minimum wage increased by 14.2 per cent. As a result, the value of the minimum wage as 
a percentage of the average wage increased. In 1999, the value of the minimum wage 
reached 61.0 per cent of the weighted average non-agricultural wage, up from 52.0 per cent 
in 1991, with a peak of 64 per cent in 1998. In comparison, the value of the minimum 
wage as a percentage of the median wage was in 1997 38.1 per cent in the United States, 
39.6 per cent in Canada, 27.6 per cent in Mexico and 57.4 per cent in France (OECD, 
1998). As a rule of thumb, an optimum combination between the coverage of the minimum 
wage and its level of protection is achieved when its value is approximately between 40 
and 50 per cent of the median non-agricultural wage. It is estimated that in 1997 over 26 
per cent of all wage workers in Panama earned less than the minimum wage, the bulk of 
which would be active in the informal sector (World Bank, 2000). In 2000, it can be 
estimated that 35 per cent of non-agricultural wage earners had earnings below the 
minimum wage. 
A good assessment of the legal situation regarding child labour and the minimum age of 
admission to employment is found in ILO, 2000. 
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Table 12: Minimum wages, 1987-2000 
Standard Percentage 
Nominal deviation Real change 
1987 1991 1995 2000 2000 2000 1987-2000 
Agriculture 
small enterprises 
large enterprises 
Fishing 
Mining 
Region 1 
Manufacturing 
small enterprises 
large enterprises 
Electricity 
Construction 
Trade 
small enterprises 
large enterprises 
Transport 
Financial services 
Services 
Region 2 
Region 3 
Region 4 
Region 5 
Median value 
Source: SIAL/ILO 
122.71 
172.63 
162.23 
162.23 
189.26 
162.23 
162.23 
162.23 
162.23 
143.50 
133.10 
133.10 
122.70 
162.23 
122.71 
172.63 
162.23 
162.23 
189.26 
162.23 
162.23 
162.23 
162.23 
143.50 
133.10 
133.10 
122.70 
162.23 
The Minimum-Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 (No.131) not ratified by Panama, 
establishes that the elements to be taken into account when determining the level of 
minimum wages are the needs of workers and their families, and economic factors 
including the levels of employment and of productivity. Although the level at which the 
minimum wage is set is the result of intense consultations, it is not clear to what extent the 
above elements have been taken into account. An important aspect in the adjustment of the 
minimum wage is its predictability. This can be enhanced when based on clearly 
established criteria and on an established practice of social dialogue. 
Figure 9: Real minimum wage (manufacturing, small enterprises) and ratio to the 
weighted non-agricultural wage 
Source: SIAL/ILO 
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(ix) Non-wage labour costs 
A large informal sector and sluggish exports could point to high wage costs in 
Panama detrimental to both higher economic growth and higher formal employment 
growth. The compensation of employees has represented some 54 per cent of GDP at 
factor cost in the late 1990’s, so the total wage bill is by no means negligible. One 
important factor in determining Panama’s competitive position is whether non-wage labour 
costs are high relative to those found in other countries. 
Table 13: Employer non-wage labour costs, as a percentage of the gross wage /a 
Family benefits 
Wage benefits 
Supplementary wage 
Paid leave 
Dismissal cost /b 
Social Security 
Health 
Pension 
Occupational safety 
Other benefits 
Training 
Housing 
Family 
Other 
Total 
Colombia 
1996 
4.0 
8.3 
5.8 
9.3 
8.0 
10.1 
2.4 
2.0 
0.0 
3.0 
0.0 
52.9 
Chile 
1996 
0.0 
19.8 
7.3 
8.3 
0.0 
0.0 
2.6 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
38.0 
Mexico 
1995 
0.0 
11.0 
10.6 
2.0 
8.8 
6.0 
2.6 
0.0 
5.0 
1.0 
2.0 
49.0 
Panama 
1999 
0.0 
8.3 
9.1 
2.3 
8.0 
2.8 
1.7 
1.5 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
33.5 
/a excludes holidays, maternity and sick leave costs and costs for unjustified dismissal 
/b cost of termination of labour contract 
Source: Tokman and Martinez, 1999 and 1997 and Ministry of Labour, Panama 
A comparative assessment of employer paid non-wage labour costs as a percentage of 
the wage suggests that Panama is not overburdened with contributions over the gross 
wage. Indeed non-wage labour costs in Panama appear lower than those found in Chile, 
often cited as the most competitive economy in the region. By way of further illustration, 
on maternity leave not included in the above table, women workers affiliated to the social 
security system are offered 14 weeks leave at 100 per cent of the previous wage over the 
covered period. The length of the maternity leave is slightly above the average of 12.4 
weeks found in Latin America. 
However, it is quite possible that small enterprises find the total (employer and 
employee) non-wage labour costs (just under 48 per cent of the net wage) in Panama still 
too high relative to their paying capacity. Evidence from the World Bank suggests that 
only 50 per cent of all private sector employees in Panama perceive the 13th month wage, 
mostly in the formal sector and among the non-poor. The following table details the total 
non-wage labour costs in Panama. 
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Table 14: Total wage based contributions, in percentage points 
Social security 
Occupational safety 
Education 
13th month 
Annual leave 
Sick leave 
Dismissal costs 
Total 
Employer 
10.75 
1.65 
1.50 
8.33 
9.09 
5.77 
2.25 
39.34 
Employee 
7.25 
1.25 
8.5 
Total 
18.00 
1.65 
2.75 
8.33 
9.09 
5.77 
2.25 
47.84 
Source: Ministry of Labour, Panama 
It is worth pointing out that total social security contributions (social security and 
occupational safety) amounting to 19.65 percentage points account for 41.1 per cent of the 
total contribution rate of 47.84 per cent. 
A different way to measure the competitiveness of the economy and whether total 
wage costs represent an explanatory factor in the economy’s performance is to look at unit 
labour costs. 
Table 15: Unit Labour Cost in Manufacturing, 1991-99 
Real wage (W/CPI) 
Labour productivity (Q/E) 
Unit labour cost (W/CPI)/(Q/E) 
1991 
100 
100 
100 
1992 
93.0 
95.9 
96.9 
1993 
97.8 
95.3 
102.5 
1994 
96.9 
93.7 
103.4 
1995 
99.0 
90.8 
109.1 
1996 
100.8 
88.3 
114.2 
1997 
98.9 
91.8 
107.7 
1998 
98.9 
99.7 
99.2 
1999 
100.0 
93.3 
107.1 
Source: SIAL/ILO 
The above table depicts the flat trend in the real wage over 1991-99, the drop by 6.7 
per cent in labour productivity and the consequent increase in the unit labour cost. It is 
interesting to observe that this increase in the unit labour cost in manufacturing is not due 
to any increase in the real wage, but rather to a fall in labour productivity. As it is not 
possible for Panama to adjust its external exchange rate, it can only increase its 
competitiveness with adjustments in labour productivity above those in the real wage. 
These data suggest that more than a labour cost problem, Panama has a labour productivity 
problem. The result in terms of lower competitiveness is the same, but the means to 
remedy it are not. Panama would not gain much reducing its labour costs in order to regain 
its competitiveness. This might in fact have adverse effects on labour productivity. 
Measures to raise labour productivity are varied, from investments in new technology to 
training, better health and working conditions, improved organization of work through 
greater cooperation and participation of workers, and less absenteeism. All are well-known 
instruments that need to be adapted to each case on hand. It is interesting to compare 
Panama with the situation in Colombia over 1990-97. Labour productivity in the 
manufacturing sector increased by 4 per cent on an average annual basis, leading to a fall 
in unit labour costs of 13 per cent. However, unit labour costs measured in dollars showed 
an increase of 54.3 in 1997 over 1990 due to an appreciation in the exchange rate for 
macroeconomic reasons totally independent of developments in the labour market (ILO, 
1999). 
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In comparative terms, employer paid non-wage contributions do not appear 
unreasonably high in Panama, although small enterprises may find it difficult to abide by 
the full provisions of the legislation. It is useful to recall here a provision of the 
Employment Policy (Supplementary Provisions) Recommendation, 1984 (No. 169): 
“Members should take into account that integration of the informal sector with 
the formal sector may reduce its ability to absorb labour and generate income. 
Nevertheless they should seek progressively to extend measures of regulation to the 
informal sector”. 
Putting social security within the reach of small enterprises is a priority6. This can 
only be done progressively rather then as a fixed rate in principle applicable to all 
enterprises, large and small, formal and informal. 
3. Social policy 
Panama expends comparatively more in social areas as a percentage of GDP than the 
average in Latin America. With 19.4 per cent of GDP expended in social domains in 1998-
99, Panama arrives in fourth position of 17 countries (average 13.1 per cent). This share 
has been stable at least since 1992. Expenditure on social security represents 
approximately 5 per cent of GDP. However, social public expenditure as a percentage of 
total public expenditure represents in Panama a significantly lower share (38.6 per cent in 
1998-99) than the average in Latin America (47.8 per cent). 
Panama enjoys relatively high health standards. Life expectancy is almost at 74 years 
at birth in 1999, higher than in Colombia (70 years) but lower than in Costa Rica (77 
years). But it is only 63 years among the poor. The number of physicians per 100,000 
people is relatively high, but it is estimated that some 20 per cent of the population has no 
adequate access to health services, using the WHO definition. There exists a degree of 
dissatisfaction among the population with respect to the quality and timeliness of health 
services. The under-five mortality rate at the national level is 21 in 1998, but much higher 
in rural areas with a high concentration of low-income households. This rate is almost 
twice the level registered in Costa Rica. A priority for Panama is to ensure a better 
distribution of health services, particularly in remote rural areas where the poor are located. 
Table 16: Social indicators 
Life expectancy at birth (years) 
Adult literacy (% pop. 15+) 
Combined gross school enrolment (%) 
Under-five mortality (0/00) 
Physician per 100,000 people 
Human Development Index 
Colombia 
70.9 
91.5 
73 
31 
116 
0.765 
Costa Rica 
76.2 
95.5 
67 
14 
141 
0.821 
Panama 
73.9 
91.7 
74 
27 
167 
0.784 
Singapore 
77.4 
92.1 
75 
4 
163 
0.876 
United States 
76.8 
95 
8 
279 
0.934 
Source: Human Development Report, 2000 
The Recommendation concerning General Conditions to stimulate Job Creation in Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises (No.189, 1998) provides much useful guidance in this respect. 
6 
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(i) Social security 
In 1997-98, the population covered by the social security system reached 64 per cent, 
and 54 per cent for the labour force. In 1992, the population covered was 53.3 per cent. 
This places Panama in 7th and 6th position respectively out of 19 countries in Latin America 
and the Caribbean in terms of coverage. Coverage varies greatly among the 10 provinces, 
between a high 77.3 per cent in Colón and a low 20.9 per cent in Darién. Nevertheless, 46 
per cent of the labour force has no old-age, invalidity and death insurance and 32 per cent 
no health and maternity insurance, although some public health services are available to 
the non-affiliated population. The lowest rates of affiliations are typically found among the 
self-employed, particularly in small enterprises and in rural areas, the unemployed, 
domestic employees, and unpaid family workers. It is estimated that some 43 per cent of 
the 35,000 small and medium-size enterprises are not affiliated to the social security 
system, as well as some 11 per cent of all wage workers (ILO, 1998 and Mesa-Lago, 
2000). Some 60 per cent of the non-affiliated population is located in only two provinces, 
Panamá and Chiriquí. 
Total contribution to the social security is currently 20.45 per cent of the wage 
(unchanged since 1982), placing Panama in 12th position in the region (Mesa-Lago, 2000), 
with 7.25 percentage points financed by the employee and 12.40 points by the employer. 
Voluntarily affiliated persons contribute a total of 18 per cent of labour earnings. Details of 
contributions by benefits are given below. The level of contribution places Panama in 12th 
position in the region, following higher contributions countries with both lower (Colombia, 
Mexico and Peru) and higher (Argentina, Costa Rica and Uruguay) levels of coverage with 
respect to Panama. The employee contribution is the 5th highest in the region (1989 data) 
whereas the employer contribution ranks 11 th. 
Pension benefit 
The pension system is relatively generous in spite of a reform of 1991 that 
substantially curtailed the benefits for early retirement. The pension age is currently at 57 
years for women and 62 for men, placing Panama in 8th position in the region. Only 15 
years of contributions are required to claim entitlement to the basic pension. The basic 
replacement rate is 60 per cent. In 1998 there were 5.2 active contributors for every 
pensioned person, a relatively low rate. Pensions are adjusted at the discretion of the State, 
in principle every three years, but there is no established methodology. 
Table 17: Social security contribution rates (in percentages), 1999 
Invalidity, old age and death 
Health and maternity 
Occupational risks 
Administrative costs 
Total 
Source: Social Security Fund and Mesa-Lago, 2000 
Employee 
6.75 
0.50 
0.00 
0.00 
7.25 
Employer 
2.75 
8.00 
1.65 
0.00 
12.40 
State 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.80 
0.80 
Total 
9.50 
8.50 
1.65 
0.80 
20.45 
In 1996, a tripartite committee was established to examine the actuarial situation of 
the pension fund. The ILO was requested to establish financial and actuarial projections up 
to the year 2050 (ILO, 1998). The ILO study published in 1998, with an update issued in 
2001, foresees a deficit in the social security system, primarily in the pension fund by the 
year 2013-15, should no reforms be introduced. This projection holds under both low and 
high economic growth scenarios. The study establishes the need to increase the 
contribution rate to the pension fund from the current 9.5 per cent to 14.8 per cent in the 
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absence of any reform, and to 14.1 per cent with reforms, including price indexation of 
pensions. Should no reforms be decided upon, the State would have to finance between 75 
and 59 per cent of the total pension burden by the year 2050.The ILO study found that the 
basic cause of the projected deficit in the pension fund was linked to the benefits reformed 
in 1991, when an optional early pension at age 50 for women and 55 for men was 
introduced. 
Among the options for reform suggested for consideration (ILO, 1998 and Mesa-
Lago, 2000) are: 
i) Extension of the years of contributions (over a long transitory period from the 
current 15 years to 25 years, slightly higher than the current average of 22.5 
years of contributions); 
ii) gradual reduction in the basic replacement rate from 60 to 50 per cent for the 
first 15 years of contribution, with a progressive rate thereafter in order to 
reward longer contribution periods; 
iii) extension of the period of the highest average wage considered for the 
calculation of the pensionable income, from the current 7 years to possibly 15 
years; and a 
iv) gradual increase in the retirement age from the current 57/62 years. 
The gender implications of these recommendations would need to be spelled out. 
To date no consensus has been reached between employers, workers and the 
government on any of the reform options. Workers tend to favour an increase in the 
contribution rate whereas employers are inclined towards longer contribution periods and 
greater efficiency in the social security system. Privatisation of the pension fund following 
the example of Chile and the introduction of private complementary pensions (now limited 
to public employees), are also among the options under discussion. The current 
government of Ms Moscoso has set up a new committee to examine the reform options and 
the ILO has been requested to update its 1997 projections. 
No deficit is foreseen for the occupational injury fund over the forecasted period. 
Moreover, the current average contribution rate (1.65 per cent) is found to generate a 
surplus. It is estimated that this rate could be reduced to between 1.23 and 0.94 per cent, or 
even lower should more resources be expended in prevention. 
Toward universal social security coverage 
In the conclusions concerning social security adopted at its 89th Session (2001), the 
International Labour Conference underscores as of “highest priority, policies and 
initiatives which can bring social security to those who are not covered by existing 
systems”. To that effect, “each country should determine a national strategy for working 
towards social security for all” closely linked to its employment strategy and other social 
policies (ILO, 2001a). The conclusions further note that it is not always possible to ensure 
the same range of benefits to all categories of people, and that priority should be given to 
the more pressing needs as identified by the groups concerned. 
These conclusions are particularly relevant in the context of Panama and its options 
to extend current coverage. This discussion must be placed in the broader context of the 
social policy of the government in Panama. Coverage is particularly low for the self-
employed. These account for an estimated one-fourth of the total uninsured population, 
which is at least 12 per cent of the total population. Self-employed are requested to affiliate 
voluntarily. A contribution of 18 per cent is currently required with no options in terms of 
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benefits. In addition the administrative requirements are cumbersome. More options, lower 
contributions and simpler payment modalities would facilitate the participation of such 
workers, predominantly from the informal sector. Furthermore, the unemployed should be 
able to retain entitlements to benefits (especially in health) for a period (between 3-6 
months). This would serve as an incentive to active job search. Finally, in 1997 only one-
third of the population of 60 years and more, was entitled to social security health and/or 
pension benefits. This group is bound to increase with the combined pressure of ageing of 
the population and informalization of the labour force. Some basic pension entitlement 
financed out of tax revenue would certainly contribute to removing from the labour force 
some elderly persons, as well as lifting out of poverty those with an income insufficient to 
sustain them. 
Universal coverage of basic benefits should form an objective for Panama, and the 
ILO should assist it in examining the available and feasible options. 
(ii) Occupational safety and health 
Rates of fatal injuries are comparatively high in Panama. The average rate of fatal 
injuries per 100,000 wage workers was 14 over the 1990’s. This rate is lower in 1998 than 
in either Argentina or Brazil, but higher than in Colombia or Costa Rica. The rate is 
particularly high in the construction industry (52 fatal injuries per 100,000 wage workers) 
where it is greater than in either Colombia (2.2 times higher) or Argentina (1.3 times 
higher). In addition, one must assume a measure of underreporting given that close to 50 
per cent of total employment in the construction industry is informal. There are no data 
indicating how many workers are specifically insured for occupational hazards in Panama. 
By comparison, in the European Union, the incidence of fatal injuries per 100,000 
employed persons was 5.03 in 1998, and 12.8 in the construction industry. 
Figure 10: Rates of fatal injuries per 100,000 employees/insured workers 
Argentina Brazil (1998) Colombia Costa Rica Panama 
(1997) (1995) (1999) (1998) 
Total Manufacturing Construction Transport 
Source: ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics 
In view of the current surplus in the occupational injury fund, Panama is registering a 
double cost: contributing more than required for the financial equilibrium of the 
occupational injury fund, and registering a high incidence of injuries. Clearly by spending 
more on prevention, Panama could enter a virtuous circle, with a lower incidence of 
occupational injuries and lower contributions to occupational injury insurance. For this to 
happen, employers and workers need to get more involved in promoting preventive 
measures at the work place. 
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Should Panama decide to set itself the objective of cutting by half the incidence rate 
of fatal injuries in the construction industry over a period of 10 years (that is a level 
equivalent to twice of that found in the European Union in 1998), this would imply a 
reduction of 2.6 fatal injuries per 100,000 wage workers per year. This would represent a 
worthwhile objective for bipartite and tripartite dialogue. 
(iii) Education 
Education has been identified as an important correlate of poverty and of income 
inequality, in Panama as well as in many other cross-country studies both at the regional 
and world level (Morley, 2001). Access to education is highly unequal in Panama, between 
rural and urban areas, and between income groups. Lack of access to education, in terms of 
fewer years of schooling and lower quality education, is an important source and 
perpetuation of poverty. In 1997 the poor in Panama had on average 5.2 years of schooling 
against 9.5 years for the non-poor. The average number of years of schooling has increased 
substantially in Panama over the 1990’s. The share of employed with 10 or more years of 
education has increased from 39.2 per cent in 1989 to 47.2 per cent in 1999. But these 
improvements have been unequally distributed. The population 25 years of age or more in 
the first quintile income group had 4.83 years of schooling in the late 1990’s whereas the 
fifth quintile had 12.22 years of schooling. The ratio between the two extreme quintiles 
was 2.52 in the late 1990’s, an increase over 1989 when the ratio was 2.29. Education 
inequality and skill differential increased in Panama as in the rest of Latin America over 
the 1990’s (Morley, 2001). The net enrolment rate in primary school was 90 per cent for 
the poor and 95 per cent for the non-poor. The secondary net enrolment rate was 82 per 
cent for the non-poor but only 37 per cent for the poor. Lower quality education in the 
form of poorly adapted premises, lack of school material, poor training of teachers is 
concentrated in rural areas and marginal urban zones, precisely where the poor are to be 
found. As a result the poor are more likely to repeat years as well as to drop out of school 
early, particularly secondary school. 
Public spending in education is high in Panama, 5.6 per cent of GDP in 1997, an 
increase from 4.7 per cent in 1992. This is higher than the average in Latin America (3.6 
per cent of GNP) and higher than the average in industrialized countries (5.3 per cent of 
GDP). Yet public spending in education is highly regressive in Panama. Spending in 
primary education is equivalent, as a proportion of total spending, to spending for 
university level that benefits almost exclusively the non-poor. The poor represent 43 per 
cent of the school age population (5-24 years), but receive only 28 per cent of total public 
spending on education. Likewise, the urban population of school age represents almost half 
of the total population but receives over 75 per cent of total public spending. 
Table 18: Public spending in education 
1992 1997 
Total spending as % of GDP 4.7 5.6 
Spending as % of total in 
Primary 40 29 
Secondary 25 33 
University 29 30 
Other 6 8 
Source: World Bank, 2000 
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Public spending in primary education is progressive as it benefits proportionately 
more to the poor. Its coverage is close to universal although improvements are still 
possible, both in terms of coverage and in quality. But this is not the case for spending in 
secondary education (33 per cent of total spending) and higher education. University 
education is free in Panama but benefits disproportionately only the higher income groups. 
The coverage and quality of secondary education is wanting. By comparison, public 
spending in education in Singapore in 1985-86 was concentrated on primary and secondary 
education (over 67 per cent), with less than 30 per cent going to tertiary education. The 
share going to higher education has proportionately increased as Singapore achieved 
universal secondary school enrolment. Panama has chosen to raise the share of 
expenditures going to tertiary education when enrolment rates in secondary school where 
far from universal. 
It is interesting to compare the educational profile of the labour force in Latin 
America and in Asia (Morley, 2001). Latin America has a higher share of university 
graduates (as a proportion of the adult male population) than most countries in Asia save 
Korea and Taiwan. But no country in Latin America equates the share of complete 
secondary schooling observed in Malaysia, Korea and Taiwan. Where Asia moved to 
complete secondary schooling following universal primary education, Latin America 
directed its efforts toward raising the supply of university graduates. Increasing the supply 
of secondary school graduates has narrowed the wage differential in Asia, whereas in Latin 
America raising the supply of university graduates has enlarged the wage differential. 
These diverging educational strategies not only translate into different patterns of 
educational and income inequality, rising in Latin America and falling in Asia. They also 
have direct implications for economic growth, particularly in the case of open economies 
dependent on exports. It has long been observed that openness had the effect of widening 
the wage differential between high and low skilled workers, putting a premium on skilled 
workers. If the supply of skilled workers is constrained, then wages will tend to increase at 
the same time as enterprises in the export sector as well as those competing with imports 
will seek to control wage costs to retain their competitiveness. A strategy to boost exports 
would therefore call for an expanded supply of skilled workers with completed secondary 
education. This is what happened in Asia, but not in Latin America. 
An important objective for Panama is to aim for complete secondary schooling within 
the next decade, ensuring at the same time to raise the quality of education. Resources 
currently directed to university education need to be diverted towards primary and 
secondary schooling. An important objective would to ensure that children of poor families 
enrol in and complete basic education, possibly with some subsidies to cover the costs 
incurred. 
(iv) Vocational training 
Any economy that is opening up to the global economy is bound to face a demand 
outstripping supply in a range of new skills as well as bottlenecks for skills for which 
demand may be declining. A number of issues are here intermingled. One is the overall 
educational level of the workforce, which as seen above, has been rising on average, but is 
heavily biased against lower income groups, the major purveyors of low and unskilled 
labour. Another concerns the tools to assess what future demand for skills is likely to 
consist of. There are no well-established methodologies to assess future demand for skills, 
save by regularly surveying opinions of persons closely linked to the market for goods and 
services, including the market for training services. Chambers of commerce, employers’ 
organisations, individual entrepreneurs and training institutes are the more likely 
candidates for such polls to be taken preferably on a regular basis. Finally, there is the 
capacity of training institutions to adapt their services to changing market requirements. 
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This is possibly the most difficult task given the well-known institutional constraints faced 
by service providers who may not be directly dependent on the market. 
As in most Latin American countries, there exists in Panama a national vocational 
training institute (INAFORP) funded by a levy on the private sector wage bill. This 
immediately presents a problem in that the institution is assured of a certain level of 
funding and decides on the allocations of its budget. In principle, the representation on its 
board of employers and workers’ organisations should allow it to maintain a close link to 
the demand for skills. In practice, training activities are largely decided by existing supply 
capacity. This is a recognized problem in most such institutions. One possible alternative, 
as has been suggested in the case of the vocational training institution in Colombia, is to 
separate training providers from training funders, requesting the former to compete for 
their services directly from enterprises, or through an institutional mechanism that would 
allow enterprises to decide more directly where they wish to spend their training funds. 
The ILO has made such proposals for the reform of the vocational training institution in 
Colombia (ILO, 1999). These have not yet been adopted, but have led to a very rich and 
timely debate about alternatives to the funding of training services. 
Over the period 1995-98, INAFORP has trained some 15,027 students on a yearly 
average, equivalent to 40.8 per cent of the average annual increase in the working age 
population (15 years and more). Women represented 39.8 per cent of all graduated 
students. However, upon closer scrutiny, it appears that only a low 1.4 per cent of all 
students followed a full year course. Students in very short courses of less than 80 hours in 
total represent 45.8 per cent of all students over the same period. The remaining majority 
of students (52.8 per cent) have followed courses of less than 300 hours (approximately 
two months). Possibly more than simply duration, content and methodology of training 
need to be reviewed. Only a very small number of students are currently enrolled in a new 
dual training system, combining study and practice in enterprises (Rosal, 1999). The 
overall training effort is therefore relatively modest, compared to what would be required. 
The potential demand for training, including re-training, could be approximated to 15 per 
cent of the employed population of 25 years and more, or some 117,000 persons annually. 
In OECD countries, the mean number of hours of training per employee per year is above 
45 hours (OECD, 2000). The participation rate in job related training (employed 
population 25 years and more) for ten countries averaged 35.6 per cent over 1994-95. No 
equivalent data are available for Panama. 
Next to INAFORP, there are a number of other programmes providing training, as 
well as several private training institutions. It is not possible to quantify the total existing 
training effort carried out in Panama, but clearly it is well below what could be considered 
a minimum. The inequities observed above in access to basic education render vocational 
education more difficult and costly. A special programme run by the Ministry of Labour 
for disadvantaged youths aims to provide them with basic vocational training in semi-
skilled occupations, with 3 months in-class and 3 months as apprentices in enterprises. 
This approach, widely used in other countries in the region (Chile and Peru for instance), is 
proving quite effective. But capacity is limited and funding as well. 
Clearly Panama needs to step up its vocational training efforts. The first priority 
should be to better spend what funding is available, which is substantial, on the basis of a 
better knowledge of the demand and supply of skills in the labour market. Panama does not 
currently dispose of an apex vocational training body responsible for defining training 
policy. In particular, certification of skills training, provided by private and public entities 
is urgently required. Participation of employers and workers as well as other social bodies, 
would greatly enhance the capacity to identify a clear policy and to push for the required 
reforms. 
30 Working Paper No. 3.doc 
(v) Income distribution 
Income distribution is known to be highly unequal in Latin America relative to other 
regions and Panama is no exception. The Gini coefficient of income inequality for the year 
1999 in Panama places it among the most unequal countries in Latin America and hence of 
the world. The poorest 40 per cent of the population receive approximately one-eighth of 
total income, whereas the share going to the richest 10 per cent is close to 40 per cent. This 
pattern has worsened in Panama during the 1990’s with an increase in the share of total 
income going to the top 10 per cent. 
Table 19: Income distribution 
Gini coefficient 
Pop. with income 50% below medium 
Pop. with income 50% below mean 
Share in total income of 
40 % poorest 
10 % richest 
Source: CEPAL, Panorama Social de América Latina, 2000-2001 
Colombia 
0.572 
46.6 
21.8 
12.3 
40.1 
Costa Rica 
0.473 
36.1 
20.7 
15.3 
29.6 
Panama 
0.557 
46.4 
23.7 
12.9 
37.1 
Morley (2001) finds three main reasons to the high and persistent income inequality 
in Latin America. The first is a pattern of investment in education skewed towards higher 
learning, thereby further concentrating human capital to the detriment of the large cohorts 
who fail to enter or complete secondary education. Technology and trade are pushing 
labour demand toward higher skill content. Yet Latin America and Panama in particular 
are still allowing large numbers of people to enter the labour market with only minimal 
skills, thereby rendering further training more difficult and costly. Second, Morley links 
unequal land distribution to rural-urban migration and the large urban low-wage low-skill 
sector, as a major explanatory factor in the regressive income distribution pattern. 
Insufficient growth and over-supply of unskilled labour have pushed wages and labour 
earnings downwards. Third, Morley finds that Latin America’s income distribution pattern 
is closely linked to the disproportionate share of the top 10 per cent of the population, a 
group much richer relative to the mean than in most other countries. This pattern is also a 
characteristic of Panama. 
Does income inequality have any effect on the rate of growth of an economy? The 
well-known Kuznets hypothesis, suggesting an inverted U pattern of income inequality 
across development stages, is increasingly put to question. Indeed, various analysts have 
argued that either very low or very high levels of income inequality have a negative effect 
on economic growth. In a recent study Cornia and Court (2001) suggest that income 
inequality as measured by a Gini coefficient above 0.40 could have negative implications 
for higher growth, in addition to costs related to crime, political instability, deterred 
investment and the like. There is also evidence suggesting that income inequality and job 
satisfaction are negatively related, higher levels of wage inequality fuelling greater job 
dissatisfaction (Hamermesh, 1999). 
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4. International labour standards 
Panama is a founding member of the ILO and has to date ratified 74 Conventions, of 
which 68 are in force. Panama has ratified all conventions considered fundamental by the 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, including the more recent 
Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No.182). Between 1987 and 2001, there 
have been 19 cases concerning Panama submitted to the attention of the Committee on 
Freedom of Association, as well as 18 individual observations to Panama from the 
International Labour Conference Committee on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations, as well as 105 individual observations on the part of the Expert 
Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR). The 
observations on conventions that are not due for revision or considered obsolete amount to 
47, as presented in the following table. 
Table 20: CEACR observations by convention (1987-2001) 
Freedom of association: 
No.87 
Collective bargaining: 
No.98 
Forced Labour: 
No.29 
No.105 
Indigenous people's: 
No.107 
Working time: 
No.30 
No.89 
Wages 
No.94 
Labour inspection: 
No.81 
Maternity protection: 
No. 3 
Total 
10 
7 
6 
2 
5 
4 
3 
6 
1 
3 
47 
information only 
information only 
Source: ILO 
An observation on the part of the CEACR ranges from an acknowledgement of the 
receipt of a report to the repeated suggestion on the modification of national legislation or 
practice. Ten observations concern the application of the Freedom of Association 
Convention, and eight forced labour matters. A large number of individual observations 
bear on maritime conventions in consideration of the large merchant fleet operating under 
Panama’s banner, and the consequently large number of seafarers whose working 
conditions depend on Panama’s law and regulations7. Panama, as is well known, has a 
large merchant fleet. In 1999, 7.1 per cent of the world’s merchant fleet was registered 
under Panama flag, representing 19.4 per cent of total merchant fleet tonnage. Ship owners 
in Japan effectively own 40 per cent of vessels registered in Panama (ILO, 2001c). 
Most of the seafarers would not be Panama nationals, but this situation reflects negatively on 
Panama’s international standing. 
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5. Social Dialogue 
There are some 26 employers’ organizations represented in an apex federation of 
private enterprise (CONEP). Some 7 trade union federations are represented in an apex 
body (CONATO) representing the workers. The union density rate is 21.1 per cent of the 
labour force at the end of the 1990’s according to some sources (Rueda-Catry, 2002), and 
11 per cent in 1997 according to another source (World Bank, 2000). Close to 60 per cent 
of total union membership comes from public sector workers. 
Employers’ and workers’ organizations are represented on various bodies such as the 
minimum wage commission, the national vocational training institute (INAFORP), the 
Social Security Agency and the InterOceanic Authority (ARI). Since 1992 employers and 
workers have joined forces to create a Labour Foundation responsible for providing 
technical assistance and training in labour matters and social dialogue in particular. In 
addition, various political and dialogue processes have been attempted during the 1990’s to 
bring employers and workers closer, such as the Bambito consultations initiated in 1993. 
The first Bambito consultations led to the adoption of a common declaration of principles. 
Similar consultations have been held later and various national dialogue processes are still 
going on. 
However, in spite of such consultations, when employers’ and workers’ organizations 
were requested to enter into consultations and negotiations with the government on matters 
of direct interest, such as the reform of the labour code in 1995, the adjustments to the 
minimum wage in 1998 and in 2000 in particular, and the reform of the social security, so 
far no agreement has been possible. The government has tended either to take decisions 
unilaterally or to postpone decisions, such as on social security. Whether the environment 
for social dialogue must change for it to play a useful role or whether social dialogue can 
be a force in shaping a new environment is a matter open for discussion. 
Strikes 
There has been an average of 2.4 strikes per year over 1991-2000. There were 9 
strikes in 1999, 8 in 1996 but none in 1991 and 1993. The average number of workers 
involved was close to 33,000. This is equivalent to 5.6 per cent of the average wage 
employed population. But this is largely due to a major conflict in agriculture in 1998 that 
mobilized close to 263,000 workers. The average number of days lost per year due to strike 
action amounts to 228,176, that is 378 days per 1,000 wage worker per year or 1.3 days per 
wage worker per year on average. 
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Compared to other countries in the region, Panama does not appear to be laden with a 
large number of strikes, quite to the contrary. 
Figure 10: Strikes ands strikers per year 
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6. Policy options for Panama 
The growth performance of Panama’s economy during the 1990’s, with respect to 
overall GDP and per capita income, has been much better than during the previous decade. 
However, the growth rate of GDP declined from an average of 6.5 per cent during 1990-94 
to 3.5 per cent during 1995-2000. Economic growth has been insufficient to significantly 
reduce poverty and to raise the quality of employment. A GDP per capita growth of at least 
2.5-3 per cent over a fairly long period would be required in order to make any serious 
dent into poverty and generate employment at a level and of a kind to raise living 
standards. 
Panama has opted to open its economy in a period of lacklustre growth. So far this 
has widened the deficit on the trade balance, without significantly boosting exports. This 
result raises a more general point on the link between openness and growth. 
It is widely believed today that openness of an economy is invariably associated with 
higher rates of economic growth. Yet even though many countries have demonstrated that 
high rates of economic growth can be sustained through a close integration with the global 
economy, there is little evidence suggesting that growth and openness are causally related. 
Economic growth is primarily determined by the levels of savings and investment, and by 
estimated returns on future investment as perceived by investors, in relation to the cost of 
borrowing. In fact, the experience of many countries that have successfully integrated the 
global economy, from China to Singapore or Mauritius, shows that they started building an 
export capacity long before they opened their economies to competition from imports. 
Export industries grew behind protective barriers and opening was only gradual, much in 
the same way today’s industrialized countries built their export industries. As Rodrik 
(2001) argues, there are few countries that have sustained high rates of economic growth 
without a rising share of foreign trade in total output. Conversely, few countries have been 
able to significantly increase their rate of growth simply by lowering their tariff barriers. It 
is the combination of domestic determinants to investment, with export promotion 
measures that account for a successful strategy. 
0 1 
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The fast growing economies of East and South-East Asia have shown a path 
combining rapid economic growth with a high growth elasticity of employment, a high rate 
of growth of labour productivity allowing for rising real wages and a sustained decline in 
the incidence of poverty. This combination was based in particular on a sustained 
expansion of productive employment in agriculture and in manufacturing. In contrast, 
Panama has only experienced moderate growth, with a high output elasticity of 
employment, but with low and falling levels of labour productivity. As a result, labour 
moved out of agriculture (where levels of labour productivity have increased but total 
output only moderately) into services at very low levels of productivity and remuneration. 
Poverty may have declined during the 1990’s, but remains at a very high level at the end of 
the decade. Employment has clearly not been the means by which to reduce poverty. 
It is essential for Panama to achieve rates of aggregate economic growth around 5-6 
per cent per year in order to generate a sustained increase in productive employment. This 
can be achieved with higher levels of investment in those sectors most likely to induce a 
greater utilization of the labour of the poor, primarily agriculture, manufacturing and 
construction. But it is equally important for the poor to be able to contribute to higher 
levels of economic growth by facilitating their access to productive resources, primarily 
land, credit, physical infrastructure as well as health and education facilities that will raise 
the human quality of the poor’s labour. 
Such an overall strategy for growth, employment and poverty alleviation has not yet 
been articulated in Panama8. It would directly respond to the principles enunciated in the 
Employment Policy Convention, 1969 (No. 122) ratified by Panama along with 90 other 
countries which determines inter-alia, that ratifying States shall “…pursue, as a major goal, 
an active policy designed to promote full, productive and freely chosen employment”. 
An application of this principle would require serious considerations of at least the 
following five policy areas. 
The first is the composition of output, specifically the neglect of agriculture and 
industry. Panama cannot afford to turn its back on two sectors that could significantly 
enhance their contribution to total exports and employment, even though they now 
represent respectively 15 and 9 per cent of the total labour force. Faster growth in 
agriculture would significantly contribute to more rapid reduction of poverty. This would 
depend on a significant increase in the level of public investment in infrastructure in rural 
areas, as well as in basic services, technical assistance and credit. An appropriate mix 
between small scale and large-scale agriculture would be required. Appropriate land titling 
procedures would also help. Likewise faster growth in the manufacturing sector would 
greatly enhance its employment generation capacity, thereby reducing the number of poor 
quality jobs in the informal sector. This would require raising its capacity to export through 
a number of WTO-compatible public support measures. It would also imply providing far 
greater support to small enterprises than is the case at present. 
Any export strategy would be dependent on a number of conditions regarding 
infrastructure, skills level of the workforce and wage costs. It would also depend on access 
to information on markets, regulatory aspects, technology, attendance to trade fairs, 
exchanges with best practice enterprises and the like. 
In 1974 the ILO produced a major report on employment in Panama, the conclusions and 
recommendations of which are very much in line with those of the present paper. In particular 
employment in agriculture, the employment implications of skewed spatial development as well 
as the place of employment in the overall macroeconomic policy were discussed. 
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A second area is education and training. Universal secondary enrolment should be 
Panama’s objective for the present decade. This would imply shifting resources from 
university education to secondary education, in order to broaden coverage and 
substantially raise enrolment rates and the quality of teaching. This would imply a 
reconsideration of the employment and working conditions of teachers. Some reform in the 
training system would be required in order to ensure a better link with evolving demand in 
skills as well as to significantly raise the number of workers in either initial or continuing 
vocational training. One option would be to offer all interested youth with a training 
opportunity of at least 6 months, followed by a temporary position as an apprentice in an 
enterprise. A national tripartite agreement could define the framework within which such 
an objective could be met. 
The third area concerns labour market policies. Wage adjustments can no longer 
ignore that the economy is now fully open. Such adjustments will immediately affect the 
competitive position of Panama, which has no autonomous monetary policy. Wage 
adjustments have to be decided in relation to adjustments made in countries trading with 
Panama, as well as on the basis of increases in labour productivity. This implies taking 
specific measures to stimulate sustained rises in productivity, as well as a capacity to 
measure trends in productivity at the national level, but also at the sectoral level as well as 
at the firm or workplace. There is much international literature and experience on this issue 
that can be drawn upon (Prokopenko and North, 1996). One simple way is to better link 
wages to actual performance. Far greater transparency in the labour market with respect to 
vacancies and job seekers would be required. At present, there is no system by which to 
measure vacancies, nor for potential employers to assess job seekers. Some labour market 
intermediation system should be introduced. There are many examples on which to draw 
upon. 
Fourth, there is the issue of social protection. Universal coverage is within Panama’s 
reach and should be considered a major objective. This may imply finding more flexible 
modalities for the self-employed. The financing of social protection has evident 
macroeconomic as well as microeconomic implications, specifically in terms of the 
active/inactive ratio, the schedule of benefits as well as by overall labour market 
conditions. Obviously, a rise in the employment rate would greatly contribute to the 
financial viability of the social security system. This would imply in particular measures to 
facilitate the access of women to the labour market. Contributions to social security 
obviously represent a cost that needs to be accounted for in the competitiveness of the 
economy. But the security that social protection can provide will be an important asset in 
facilitating changes between jobs, in stimulating the workforce and in enhancing an overall 
sense of security. Social protection has a role to play in poverty alleviation. Specifically, a 
benefit could be provided to low-income mothers on the condition that children attend 
school. The effectiveness of this approach has been proven in several countries (Lavinas, 
2001). The Government should also consider adopting a basic tax-financed pension 
scheme for all elderly persons without the benefit of a pension. This could be means-tested 
and directed to poor households. 
Finally, there is the role of social dialogue. The basic question can be put very 
simply: is social dialogue seen as part of the solution, or part of the problem ? What would 
be minimal conditions for a fruitful dialogue between employers’ and workers’ 
representatives, and with the government? This can only be solved in terms of a 
negotiating agenda in which all three parties have a stake and in which all three can obtain 
significant results. The high income inequality observed in Panama is a sign of a weak 
social cohesion that bears directly on social dialogue. But social dialogue can be a means 
to decide on measures that could reduce such income inequality, particularly if high 
economic growth can be combined with sustained productive employment generation. 
Social dialogue and in particular wage and social benefit negotiations are critical in such a 
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context. The experience of countries that have moved along such a path could usefully 
inspire social actors in Panama. 
A policy package such as the one discussed above focused on decent work holds the 
promise of strengthening the foundations of economic growth and social development in 
Panama in the context of globalisation. However, any debate about policy options for 
Panama has to be carried out in Panama among the relevant representative bodies and in 
the appropriate fora, with the broadest possible consultations. It is hoped that this piece 
will at least stimulate such discussion. 
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